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Abstract
This paper conducts the ﬁrst assessment of the optimal mon-
etary policy in the case of behavioral New Keynesian model pro-
posed by Gabaix (2016). Consistent with the previous studies,
I ﬁnd that monetary policy under commitment continues to be
important for optimal policy, but the optimal policy is found to
be more history-dependent than in the traditional New Keynesian
model. Importantly, I ﬁnd that monetary policy under discretion
may be optimal under some constraints on the parameters of the
model which seems to correspond better to the reality of the con-
duct of monetary policy in central banks of developing, emerging
and transitional economies. This ﬁnding is considered as ﬁlling the
∗I would like to thank Yassine Bouhdaoui for his valuable comments. The opinions expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of any of my aﬃliations. Author contact:
Economic Department, Mohammed V University-Agdal, Rabat; e-mail: lahcen.bouna@gmail.com.
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gap that always has been between the practice and the theory of
the optimal monetary policy.
JEL Codes: D84, E52.
1 Introduction
While the literature on optimal monetary policy has been explored widely
in the case of the traditional New Keynesian model under diﬀerent compli-
cations1 , there is little research in this area in the case of New Keynesian
models with bounded rationality. In fact, the behavioral New Keynesian
model as proposed by Gabaix (2016) departs from the traditional model by
relaxing the assumption of fully rational agents. Within the new framework,
agents are assumed to be partially myopic and do not anticipate the future
perfectly. The features incorporated in the behavioral New Keynesian model
resolve lot of unsettled questions that has been left unresolved by the tra-
ditional New Keynesian model. First, the zero lower bound when it is hit
implies large depressions in the traditional model. In contrast, depressions
are contained and moderated when bounded rationality is assumed. Sec-
ond, when the economy is in the zero lower bound forever the Taylor rule
1e.g. Clarida et al. (1999), Gali (2008, 2015), Woodford (2010).
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is violated and the equilibrium is indeterminate (from one period to another
economy jump randomly to diﬀerent equilibrium). Such theoretical result
has not been observed in the aftermath of the crisis of 2008. In this regard,
the new model contributes to avoid this strong result of multiple equilib-
ria. Third, Cochrane (2016) has pointed out that in the traditional New
Keynesian model a rise of interest rate may lead to a rise in inﬂation (an
equilibrium among others, due to the multiple equilibria problem). However,
the behavioral model helps to overturn this striking result2.
Moreover, the rationale for adopting this behavioral New Keynesian model
to study the optimal monetary policy lies in the critiques that have been ad-
dressed to the traditional model, its underlying assumptions and its policy
implications. As has been pointed out by Stiglitz (2010), one important un-
derlying assumption of the traditional model is the rational behavior of the
economy, but the economy seems inconsistent with any model of rationality.
Such criticism has been carried out by the behavioral New Keynesian model
which is assuming partially myopic agents which is leading to relax the as-
sumption of rationality. In addition, Stiglitz criticized even more the policy
prescriptions that arise from the traditional model. Such criticism will be
2For more problems that has been resolved by this behavioral approach see Gabaix (2016).
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carried out through this paper.
Looking at the number of questions that has been addressed with the be-
havioral New Keynesian model and the results that have been found, I expect
to be interesting to study the optimality of monetary policy within this new
framework, in order to come out with some results that reconcile between
the theory of optimal monetary policy and the practice of the central banks.
Indeed, the literature on the optimal monetary policy largely gives the credit
to commitment3 in setting an optimal policy while the discretion is seen as
yielding to undesirable rule for the conduct of monetary policy4 . However,
the practice in most central banks in developing, emerging and transitional
economies is diﬀerent from what the theory suggests (except in some excep-
tional circumstances like the forward guidance). In practice, in every period
(month or trimester) the committee of monetary policy decides on interest
rate without committing to future plan due to the structural changes that
face those economies. Such a policy can be qualiﬁed as discretion, not in
the literal sense, but to the extent that the central bank reoptimizes every
period without preannouncing any trajectory for future policies. Taking into
account these observations, my aim in this paper is to ﬁll this gap between
3See Orphanides (2007)
4see Clarida et al. (1999)
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the practice and the theory of optimal monetary policy.
The present paper proposes to study the optimality of monetary policy
within Behavioral New Keynesian model with bounded rational agents pro-
posed in Gabaix (2016). Within a wide range of central banking literature,
two methods have been used. The ﬁrst one is the linear quadratic problem
used by Clarida et al. (1999)and Gali (2008, 2015). In this approach the cen-
tral bank seeks to choose a path for inﬂation and output gap that minimize
a quadratic loss function. The second approach is that of welfare-based util-
ity maximization by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). However, connection
can be established between utility maximization and linear-quadratic pol-
icy problems of the sort5 . One possible limitation of this approach is that,
while the widely used representative agent approach may be a micro founded
method to study the behavior of the economy, it could be highly misleading
methodology for studying welfare. As illustrated in Clarida et al. (1999), if
some groups suﬀer more in recessions than others and there are incomplete
insurance and credit markets, then the utility of a hypothetical representa-
tive agent might not provide an accurate barometer of cyclical ﬂuctuations
in welfare. That's why literature takes a pragmatic approach to this issue
5I refer here to the Chapter of Woodford (2010) for a formal presentation of the link between the two
methods.
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by simply assuming that the objective of monetary policy is to minimize the
squared deviations of output and inﬂation from their respective target levels.
In this paper, I work with the ﬁrst approach of linear quadratic deviations
to study the optimal monetary policy within the behavioral New Keynesian
model of Gabaix (2016). The remainder of the paper is the following. The
second section will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the behavioral New
Keynesian model and a comparison with the basic one. Section three will
study the optimal monetary policy under discretion and the forth section will
take up the same question under commitment. A ﬁnal section will discuss
the main results.
2 Behavioral New Keynesian Model: Remainder and
Comparison
The model that will be used is based on Gabaix (2016a and 2016b). This
framework is based on the psychological foundation of Bounded Rationality,
so the assumption of rational expectations hypothesis is relaxed. In this
approach, agents build a simpliﬁed model of the world. The representation
crated will be sparse, in the sense that agents will pay attention to just a
6
few parameters in order to make an economic decision. This will lead to a
modiﬁed New Keynesian model.
The behavioral New Keynesian model is designed to overcome the unre-
alism of the inﬁnitely forward-looking agent who computes the whole equi-
librium in her own head. Moreover, it can be viewed as an alternative to the
overstatement of expectations in the traditional New Keynesian models as
raised by Blachard (2008):
That anticipations matter a lot is obviously true. That people and ﬁrms
look into the future, directly or by relying on the forecasts of others, in
forming anticipations is also obviously true. Whether the basic model does
not overstate the role of anticipations is however open to question.
General Framework: Sparse Max Operator
Gabaix (2014) can be viewed as the starting point of his work on bounded
rationality. The sparse max operator is a generalization of the traditional
max operator under constraint.
Under the rational version, agent faces a maximization problem,maxav(a, x),
where a is an action and x is a state variable. There is an attention vector,
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m, and an attention-dependent function v(a, x,m). It can be represented as:
v(a, x,m) ≡ v(a,m1x1, ...,mnxn)
This function can be perceived as utility function when the consumer is
partially inattentive to the vector x. Whenmi = 1, it means that the agent
is fully attentive to the variable xi when making her decision. In contrast,
when mi = 0 the agent is completely inattentive to xi which means that
agent think this variable is not relevant for her decision.
Solving the problem of maximizing the attention-dependent function will
lead to a solution of the form:
a(x,m) := argmaxav(a, x,m)
The sparse max operator will be the same as the traditional max operator,
but including some vector of inattention6 which will lead to a solution that
contains the agents' inattention parameters.
Behavioral New Keynesian Model
Following Gabaix (2016b), the behavioral IS relation is the following:
y˜t = MEty˜t+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) (1)
6More developments and cases can be found in Gabaix (2014, 2016a).
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With M ∈ [0, 1] representing the inattention of the household. One can
notice that the weight given to expectation is becoming inferior of that in
the traditional NK model. Moreover, in this framework the traditional NK
model can be obtained as a particular case.
For the behavioral New Keynesian Phillips Curve, it is represented by the
equation:
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 + κy˜t (2)
When M f = 1 we recover the traditional model. The behavioral model
changes simply β to βM f in order to account for some myopia about the
future evolutions.
Notation and Deﬁnition
yt the (log) output, y
e
t the eﬃcient output and y
n
t is the natural output.
xt ≡ yt − yet is the welfare relevant output gap. The relationship that links
those variables: y˜t ≡ xt + (yet − ynt ).
By using this relation, one can easily transform the IS and Phillips curve
equations in term of welfare-relevant output gap as:
xt = MEtxt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1 − ret ) (3)
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With ret = r
n
t +
1−Mρu
σ is the eﬃcient interest rate perceived by households.
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 + κxt + ut (4)
With ut ≡ κ(yet − ynt ) is a cost-push shock, that evolves as an AR(1): ut =
ρuut−1 + t.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Discretion
The central bank makes whatever decision is optimal each period without
committing itself to any future actions. That case is often referred in the
literature as optimal policy under discretion. One can observe that this sce-
nario accords best with reality. In practice, no central bank makes any kind
of commitment about its future monetary policy (except in some exceptional
circumstances like the forward guidance operated after the crisis). In this
respect, it seems important to study the optimal policy in this context.
Under discretion, the central bank solves the problem in sequential way.
Each period the central bank seeks to minimize:
pi2t + αxx
2
t
Subject to:
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 + κxt + ut
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coeﬃcient αx represents the weight of output gap ﬂuctuations (relative to
inﬂation) in the loss function, and is given by αx =
κ
 where κ is the coef-
ﬁcient on xt in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and  is the elasticity of
substitution between goods. One can interpretαx as the weight attached by
the central bank to deviations of output from its eﬃcient level in its own loss
function, which does not necessarily have to coincide with the household's.
The optimality condition for the problem above is given by:
xt = − κ
αx
pit (5)
The relation (5) must be satisﬁed forever in order to minimize the loss
function; it can be called the targeting rule for the central bank. In the
face of inﬂationary pressures (due to cost-push shock), the central bank must
act by driving output below its eﬃcient level. Such a policy is widely called by
leaning against the wind policy, which must be the response of monetary
authority until the condition is satisﬁed. Though this principle may seem
obvious, it provides very simple criteria for evaluating monetary policy.
Using the condition (5) to replace for xt in (4), I obtain:
pit =
αxβM
f
αx + κ2
Etpit+1 +
αx
αx + κ2
ut (6)
Solving forward leads to:
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pit =
αx
αx + κ2 − αxβM fρuut (7)
And for the output gap I ﬁnd:
xt =
−κ
αx + κ2 − αxβM fρuut (8)
If we take the following notation: ψM =
1
αx+κ2−αxβMfρu , then I ﬁnd the
compressed expressions: pit = αxψMut and xt = −κψMut.
The expressions for inﬂation and output gap, simply, states that central
bank lets the output gap and inﬂation deviates from their targets by a value
that is proportional to the cost-push shock. However, the central bank cannot
choose the values of those variables. One possible method is to set an interest
rate rule that will lead to the desired values of inﬂation and output gap. By
writing the IS equation in term of those expressions, I ﬁnd:
−κψMut = M(−κψMut+1)− σ(it − αxψMut+1 − ret )
By simplifying, I ﬁnd the optimal interest rate under discretion is:
it = r
e
t + ΨM,iut (9)
With: ΨM,i = αxψMρu +
κ
σψM − κσMψMρu.
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Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
In order to assess the optimality of the policy rule (9), we have to check if
the equilibrium that will be obtained is unique. Otherwise, this policy rule
will be undesirable in case it leads to multiple equilibria.
If the previous rule is used to eliminate the nominal interest rate in (3), I
will have the following equations:
xt = MEtxt+1 − σ(ΨM,iut − Etpit+1)
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 + κxt + ut
We can write this system in matrix form as:
(
xt
pit
) = (
M σ
κM βM f + κσ
)(
Etxt+1
Etpit+1
) + (
−σΨM,i
1− σκΨM,i
)ut
Which can be represented as:
zt = AEtzt+1 +But (10)
With: zt = (xt, pit)
′ and A = (
M σ
κM βM f + κσ
) and B = (
−σΨM,i
1− σκΨM,i
).
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The equilibrium will be unique if and only if the eigenvalues of A are
inside the unit circle.
Proposition:(Condition of uniqueness of the equilibrium)
The rule derived in the case of monetary policy under discretion yields to
unique equilibrium if and only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
M + βM f + κσ − βMM f < 1.
Under the rational expectation hypothesis in the traditional New Keynesian
model: M = M f = 1, this condition will be :1+κσ < 1 which is not satisﬁed.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Within the framework that takes into account the inattention of agents,
the monetary policy that seeks to act every period in order to minimize the
welfare losses will be optimal under the condition derived in proposition 1.
In contrast, in the traditional model this rule of monetary policy is seen
as undesirable rule because it leads to multiple equilibria phenomena (see
King et al. (2003) and Gali (2008)). So, the behavioral model contributes
to overcome the problem of multiple equilibrium outcomes in the case of
discretion.
14
Under the traditional model, the discretionary monetary policy is unde-
sirable for the simple fact that agents have an inﬁnite horizon and today's
decisions are formulated based on expectations of the future. Within this
framework, agents form their expectations taking into account how the cen-
tral bank adjusts policy, given that the central bank is free to reoptimize
every period. The rational expectations equilibrium resulting have the prop-
erty that agents are uncertain about the future conduct of monetary policy,
hence the equilibrium obtained is not optimal and the discretion is not a
suited strategy for optimal policy conduct in this framework. However, this
conduct of monetary policy is the closest to reality. Unlike the traditional
model, monetary policy under discretion appears to be optimal if the model
parameters satisfy the proposition 1.
By comparing our ﬁnding to the traditional case, borrowing solutions from
Clarida et al. (1999) for the NK model and preserving my notation:
pit = αxqut (11)
xt = −κqut (12)
with: q = 1αx+κ2−αxβρu Some simple arithmetic shows that:
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q > ψM (13)
The conclusion that arises from this result is that the central bank adjusts
aggressively inﬂation and output gap in the traditional case (by the param-
eter q), while in the behavioral New Keynesian model the response is much
smoother. In my belief, in the bounded rationality case inﬂation and output
gap depend less on the expectations, respectively by M f and M . To the ex-
tent that expectations no more inﬂuence the actual variables, the policy that
act to stabilize inﬂation and output every period may perceived as optimal.
In order to be analytically tractable and to visualize our results in a simple
way, we have to turn to some simulation results.
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Figure 1: Response in the case of Permanent cost-push shock in the New Keynesian Model
Figure 1 shows the reactions of output gap, inﬂation and price level in
response to one percent permanent cost-push shock in the case of the tradi-
tional New Keynesian model 7.It is clear that this shock implies an increase
one by one in inﬂation and hence in the price level. In the front of this
negative shock, the central bank seeks to stabilize the economy by reducing
the output gap by six percent regarding the relationship (12). However, as
shown by the inequality (13) the response of the central bank will be less
aggressive if the agents' inattention is incorporated in the model.
7the model used is that of Gali (2008) and the code for the simulation was provided by Johannes
Pfeifer and it is available at : www.github.com
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Figure 2: Response in the case of Permanent cost-push shock in the Behavioral New
Keynesian Model
In the ﬁgure 2, I reported the simulation results 8 in the case of the
Behavioral New Keynesian model with the following values: M = 0.4 for the
degree of myopia for households, andM f = 0.7 for the myopia of ﬁrms. The
reason why I suppose that households are more myopic than ﬁrms is that
those laters have the ﬁnancial means to buy forecasting services in order to
form more accurate expectations. As a result, I ﬁnd that inﬂation does not
increase one by one in response to cost-push shock instead it rises only by
0.6 percent rather than 1 percent as in the traditional model. In response
8The code used is modiﬁed and adapted from Johannes Pfeifer and it is available by demand
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to this shock the central bank reduces the output gap only by around three
percent which is represented by the relation (13).
To summarize, the behavioral New Keynesian model has two novelties
with respect to the literature in the case of optimal monetary policy under
discretion. First and unlike what the traditional New Keynesian model sug-
gests, the interest rate rule derived is optimal under certain condition on the
parameters of the model. Second, the response of the central bank to cost-
push shocks is less aggressive as in the traditional model. Myopia of agents
about the future plays a key role as long as the monetary policy actions are
a synonym of expectations management as stated in King et al. (2008).
4 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
The unconstrained solution
In this case, the central bank is assumed to be credible ﬁrstly, and to be able
to commit to a policy plan. Monetary authority must be able to choose a
path for output gap and inﬂation (xt, pit)
∞
t=0 over the inﬁnitely-lived horizon
in order to minimize the intertemporal loss function:
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12
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(pi2t + αxx
2
t )
Subject to the sequence of constraints:
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 + κxt + ut
By writing the Lagrangian and diﬀerentiating with respect to xt and pit,
it yields the optimality conditions:
αxxt − κγt = 0
pit + γt − γt−1M f = 0
With γt's are the Lagrangian multipliers.
The ﬁrst order conditions yields to the condition:
xt −M fxt−1 = − κ
αx
pit
By iterating this condition, we obtain:
xt = − κ
αx
∞∑
i=0
(M f)ipit−i + (M f)tx0 (14)
The relation (14) constitutes the targeting rule under commitment. Cen-
tral bank sets the size of output gap taking into account the actual and past
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inﬂation weighted by the terms of myopia. When the central bank looks at
past inﬂation, it will be done with some sort of inattention implying that
just more recent observations that will be given more importance in setting
the value of output gap.
Two remarks can be drawn at this stage. Firstly and by comparing the
targeting rule (14) under commitment with (3.2) the rule under discretion,
I ﬁnd that under commitment the targeting rule is more history-dependent
than in the previous section. The central bank commits to stabilize inﬂation
by lowering the actual output under its eﬃcient level, but also by lowering
the future output if it is needed in order to smooth the central bank's actions.
This result is consistent with the study of Woodford (2009) in a New Key-
nesian framework with Near Rational agents. It is appealing in this regard
to notice that in the present paper as in Woodford (2009) the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis is relaxed, and both models yields to the same result.
Secondly and by comparing (4.1) with the targeting rule resulting from the
traditional model stating that central bank needs to lower output below its
eﬃcient level in proportion to the deviation of the price level from an implicit
target (See Gali 2008), such a theoretical result may not be suited for the
central banks conduct of monetary policy in reality. In the case of the behav-
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ioral model, the targeting rule (4.1) is linking the output gap with inﬂation
and the reactions for the central bank will be to set values for output gap
given the past path for inﬂation.
By combining the optimality condition with the New Keynesian Phillips
curve (2.4), I obtain:
pit = −δ κ
2
αx
t∑
i=0
(M f)ipit−i + δβM fEtpit+1 + δut
With δ ≡ αxαx+κ2 and I assume that x0 = 0 in the starting period the
economy was on equilibrium.
The stationary solution for this equation is:
pit = −η κ
2
αx
t∑
i=0
(M f)ipit−i +
η
1− ηβM fρuut (15)
With: η ≡ 1−
√
1−4βδ2
2βδ .
Solving for the output gap, I ﬁnd:
xt = (1 +
κη
M f
)xt−1 − ηκ
αx(1− ηβM fρu)ut (16)
Relations (15) and (16) represent the reactions of the central bank to a
cost-push shock. It appears that both equations are history-dependent more
than the traditional model. The central bank responds to a cost-push shock
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in the current and future periods until inﬂation and output gap return to
their original targets. This slow adjustment process of targeted variables
induces some persistence in the behavior of the output gap and the rate of
inﬂation.
Once again and to visualize more clearly the results, it is necessarily to
illustrate by some simulations.
Figure 3: Response in the case of Permanent cost-push shock in the New Keynesian Model
Figure 3 extends the reaction of target variables following a cost-push
shock in the case of traditional New Keynesian model. It is thus clear
that inﬂation rose 0.6 percent while the output gap decreases by 4 per-
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cent.Comparing this results with those of the ﬁgure 4, in the case of behav-
ioral New Keynesian model, I ﬁnd the same outcomes in terms of changes in
the output gap and inﬂation. Though the two models are facing the same
shock, one can remark that the price level in ﬁgure 3 returns to its initial
level, due to the decrease in inﬂation below its target in the medium term,
unlike the ﬁgure 4 in which the price level presents some persitent behavior.
This diﬀerence can be explained by the ﬁnding that in the behavioral model
the variables are more history-dependent than in the traditional model.
Figure 4: Response in the case of Permanent cost-push shock in the Behavioral New
Keynesian Model
As the unconstrained solution seems diﬃcult either to implement or to
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completely interpret, I now turn to characterize the optimal policy in some
constrained family of solutions.
The constrained solution
In this case, I accordingly consider a rule for the output gap xt that is con-
tingent on the fundamental shock ut, in the following way:
xt = −ωut (17)
for all t, where ω > 0 is the coeﬃcient of the feedback rule.
Combining equation (*) with the Phillips curve (2.2), in turn, implies that
inﬂation under the rule,pit, is also a linear function of the cost push shock:
pit = βM
fEtpit+1 − κωut + ut
Solving forward, it yields to:
pit =
1− κω
1− βM fρuut
This can be rewritten as:
pit =
κ
1− βM fρuxt +
1
1− βM fρuut
The problem of the central bank will be to ﬁnd the optimal solution pa-
rameter ω by minimizing the welfare loss function subject to the condition
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(*). It follows that:
xt =
−κ
αx(1− βM fρu)pit
The relationship (*) represents the central bank targeting rule under com-
mitment in the case of the behavioral New Keynesian model. While the un-
constrained solution seems to be too complex to completely interpret, the
targeting rule in the family of solutions of type (4.4) provides a tractable
analytical solution describing the way the central bank act in response to
cost-push shock. It looks very close to the targeting rule under discretion;
they diﬀer just by the term: 1
1−βMfρu .
Comparing the targeting rule (*) with the one obtained in the case of the
traditional model as in Clarida et al. (1999):
xt =
−κ
αx(1− βρu)pit
One can notice that, in absolute term, the response of the central bank in
the case of the traditional model will be much harder than in the behavioral
model in lowering the output gap.
To sum up, in this section two families of solutions under commitment were
presented relaying to the behavioral New Keynesian model. The ﬁrst one is
the unconstrained solution of the optimal monetary policy, which concludes
that the targeting rule for the central bank is more history dependent than
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in the traditional case but also it includes the terms of ﬁrms myopia. Such
feature in the targeting rule highlights the importance of private expectations
in terms of the conducts in monetary policy. The policy recommendation that
arises from this fact is to take into account the private expectations form while
conducting monetary policy.The second family of solutions is the constrained
one, and it sheds light about the diﬀerences between the traditional case and
the behavioral case in some simple analytical and tractable way.
5 Discussion
The present paper constitutes an assessment of the optimal monetary policy
under discretion and commitment in a behavioral New Keynesian framework.
With the comparison of the traditional New Keynesian model, we have pro-
vided a condition on the parameters of the model when the discretionary
moenaty policy can be optimal which constitutes a theoritical foundation of
the practice of the central banks in the sense of deciding period-by-period
the optimal response to economic development. Moreover, in the case of the
policy under commitment we showed that the response of the central bank
is very smooth due to persistence that arises in the targeted variables.
In one hand, our results in the case of discretion can be supported by
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numerous studies that take up this question under diﬀerent angles. As Sauer
(2010) noted:"Discretion gains relative to the timeless-perspective rulei.e.,
the short-run losses become relatively more importantif the private sec-
tor behaves less forward looking", which is satisﬁed in the behavioral New
Keynesian model. Another study that supports our ﬁnding is that of Den-
nis (2010), in which he shows that discretion is found to dominate timeless
perspective policymaking when the price/wage Phillips curves are relatively
ﬂat due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital (or labor).
In the other hand, commitment continues to be important for the opti-
mality of the monetary policy as in the benchmark model. However, the
targeted variables are shown to be more history-dependent in the behavioral
model and since the authority commits to a history-dependent policy in the
future, it is able to optimally spread the eﬀects of shocks over several periods.
This result is in line with the most of the optimal monetary policy literature
but the most important ﬁnding is that the actions of the central bank in the
behavioral model are less aggressive than the traditional one.
As pointed out by Dotsey (2008), the rationale behind preferring the com-
mitment over discretion lies in the fact that policymakers who can commit
have the ability to follow through on promised actions that they can inﬂuence
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expectations in a desirable way. The discretionary planner makes no promises
and, as a result, does not have a similar ability to inﬂuence expectations. A
planner who can commit to future actions in various situations can aﬀect
what people expect will happen in these situations, and these expectations
inﬂuence current behavior. But as in the behavioral New Keynesian model,
the assumption of rational agents is relaxed and then those policymakers
prefrences are to nuance.
Turning to a comparison of the values of the policy loss function, the
simulations conducted in the previous two sections show the following results
reported in the table below:
• New Keynesian Model B. New Keynesian Model
Under Discretion 503 325
Under Commitment 146 145
One can ﬁgure out that under commitment both models deliver approxi-
mately the same value of the loss function. Although, the behavioral model
performs well when it comes to the case of discretionary policy. In addition,
when comparing the discretion versus commitment under the same model it
appears that commitment is superior to discretion in both models. However,
the diﬀerence of loss between the discretion and commitment in the behav-
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ioral model is much smaller than in the traditional New Keynesian model.
What policy recommendations can be drawn ? Firstly, the monetary pol-
icy under discretion can be optimal for developing, emerging and transitional
economies where the policy making process is much closer to discretion rather
than commitment. Such a result constitutes a theoretical foundation of the
practice of lot of central banks around the world and my respond to the crti-
cisms raised by Stiglitz (2010). Secondly, the improvement of the monetary
policy framework for these less developed central banks comes out with an
important increase in welfare as had been shown by the simulations result.
References
Adjemian, Stéphane, et al. Dynare: Reference manual, version 4. Dynare
Working Papers 1, CEPREMAP, 2011.
Benigno, Pierpaolo, and Michael Woodford. "Optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy: A linear-quadratic approach." NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003,
Volume 18. The MIT Press, 2004. 271-364.
Blanchard, Olivier J. The state of macro. No. w14259. National Bureau
of economic research, 2008.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. The science of mone-
30
tary policy: a new Keynesian perspective. No. w7147. National bureau of
economic research, 1999.
Cochrane, John H. "Do Higher Interest Rates Raise or Lower Inﬂation?."
Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
(2016).
Dennis, Richard, and Federico Ravenna. "Learning and optimal monetary
policy." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32.6 (2008): 1964-1994.
Dennis, Richard. "When is discretion superior to timeless perspective
policymaking?." Journal of Monetary Economics 57.3 (2010): 266-277.
Dotsey, Michael, and Charles I. Plosser. "Commitment versus discretion
in monetary policy." Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review
(2008): 1-8.
Friedman, Benjamin M., and Kenneth N. Kuttner. Implementation of
monetary policy: How do central banks set interest rates?. No. w16165.
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
Khan, Aubhik, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman. "Optimal
monetary policy." The Review of Economic Studies 70.4 (2003): 825-860.
King, Robert G., Yang K. Lu, and Ernesto S. Pasten. "Managing expec-
tations." Journal of Money, Credit and banking 40.8 (2008): 1625-1666.
31
Gabaix, Xavier. Behavioral Macroeconomics Via Sparse Dynamic Pro-
gramming. No. w21848. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
Gabaix, Xavier. "A Behavioral New Keynesian Model." preliminary New
York University working paper (2016). King, Robert G., Yang K. Lu, and
Ernesto S. Pasten. "Managing expectations."Journal of Money, Credit and
banking 40.8 (2008): 1625-1666.
Guender, Alfred V. "The timeless perspective vs. discretion: Theory and
monetary policy implications for an open economy." Journal of International
Money and Finance 30.8 (2011): 1638-1658.
Leitemo, Kai, and Ulf Söderström. "Robust monetary policy in the New
Keynesian framework." Macroeconomic Dynamics 12.S1 (2008): 126-135.
Rotemberg, Julio, and Michael Woodford. "An optimization-based econo-
metric framework for the evaluation of monetary policy." NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual 1997, Volume 12. MIT Press, 1997. 297-361.
Sauer, Stephan. "Discretion rather than rules? When is discretionary
policy-making better than the timeless perspective?." (2007).
Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Rethinking macroeconomics: What failed, and how
to repair it." Journal of the European Economic Association 9.4 (2011): 591-
645.
32
Woodford, Michael. Optimal monetary stabilization policy. No. w16095.
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
Woodford, Michael. "Robustly optimal monetary policy with near-rational
expectations." The American Economic Review 100.1 (2010): 274-303.
33
Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1
In order to have a unique equilibrium, matrix A must have eigenvalues inside
the unit circle.
zt = AEtzt+1 +But
First, the characteristic function of A is deﬁned as follows: f(λ) = det(A−
λI). With I is the unity matrix.
By a simple calculation of the determinant, I ﬁnd:
f(λ) = λ2 − (M + βM f + κσ)λ+ βMM f
The eigenvalues of A are the solutions of the equation: f(λ) = 0, by
solving this second order equation I ﬁnd the following solutions:
λ1 =
M + βM f + κσ +
√
∆
2
λ2 =
M + βM f + κσ −√∆
2
With: ∆ = (M+βM f +κσ)2−4βMM f > 0. Which assure the existence
for the real solutions λ1 and λ2.
Since I have λ2 < λ1, in order to ﬁnd a condition on the uniqueness of
the equilibrium I have to verify just that λ1 is inside the unist cercle and the
other condition will follow.
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λ1 < 1⇒M + βM f + κσ − βMM f < 1
.
35
